Auszüge aus El Baradeis Bericht an den UN-Sicherheitsrat

As noted in the Director General's report of 27 February 2006 ... the Agency has repeatedly requested Iran to provide additional information on certain issues related to its enrichment programme.

Iran declined to discuss these matters at the 12-14 February 2006 meeting in Tehran... on the grounds that, in its view, they were not within the scope of the [nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty] Safeguards Agreement.
(...)
All the nuclear material declared by Iran to the Agency is accounted for. Apart from the small quantities previously reported to the [IAEA's] Board, the Agency has found no other undeclared nuclear material in Iran.
However, gaps remain in the Agency's knowledge with respect to the scope and content of Iran's centrifuge program.
Because of this, and other gaps in the Agency's knowledge, including the role of the military in Iran's nuclear program, the Agency is unable to make progress in its efforts to provide assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.
After more than three years of Agency efforts to seek clarity about all aspects of Iran's nuclear program, the existing gaps in knowledge continue to be a matter of concern.
Any progress in that regard requires full transparency and active co-operation by Iran - transparency that goes beyond the measures prescribed in the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol - if the Agency is to be able to understand fully the 20 years of undeclared nuclear activities by Iran.
(...)
Regrettably, these transparency measures are not yet forthcoming.
With Iran's decision to cease implementing the provisions of the Additional Protocol, and to confine Agency verification to the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement, the Agency's ability to make progress in clarifying these issues, and to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities, will be further limited.
While the results of Agency safeguards activities may influence the nature and scope of the confidence building measures that the Board requests Iran to take, it is important to note that safeguards obligations and confidence building measures are different, distinct and not interchangeable.
The implementation of confidence building measures is no substitute for the full implementation at all times of safeguards obligations.

Von allen an diesem Konflikt beteiligten Gruppen ist die IAEA sicherlich die aufrichtigste und vertrauenswürdigste. Deswegen ist der Bericht El Baradeis sehr ernst zu nehmen und gibt Anlaß zur Sorge, was auch immer die konkreten Gründe des Irans sein mögen, die Arbeit dieser Organisation zu behindern. Daß dahinter nur verletzter Nationalstolz steht, überwacht zu werden, ist als sehr unwahrscheinlich zu erachten.